


PISA

A financially accountable
watching network

Patrick McCorry

WHY IS OFF-CHAIN EXCITING?


PISA




Bypass all blockchain latency and fees
While still retaining non-custodial security guarantees.


Only scaling solution that will exceed 10k tps
99% of transactions are LOCAL and never reach the global network.

But what does an “off-chain network” look like?




P2P Routing Network








Watching Network



Non-Custodial Hubs




P2P Routing Network








Watching Network



Non-Custodial Hubs



P2P Routing Network




**Settlement System and
Root of Trust of all Layer 2**







Watching Network




Non-Custodial Hub



Open-source, global, permissionless and non-custodial financial system.
It is coming...




P2P Routing Network



Settlement System and Root of Trust of all Layer 2

P/SA
RESEARCH



LIQUIDITY NETWORK



Plasma Group



Settlement System and
Root of Trust of all Layer 2

Plenty of talks about channels + plasma.



We'll "briefly" talk about how
replace-by-revocation works **before**
deep-diving into the watching network



Watching Network



What does a lightning channel look like? (replace-by-revocation)

Alice and Bob always have a transaction (“state”) that only they can broadcast to trigger a dispute.




What does a lightning channel look like? (replace-by-revocation)

Authorising a payment is a two-step process



What does a lightning channel look like? (replace-by-revocation)

1. Both parties authorise a new state
(a transaction only the counterparty can broadcast)



What does a lightning channel look like? (replace-by-revocation)


Either State 1 or State 2 can be broadcast...

Second step revokes old balance and confirms the new one.



What does a lightning channel look like? (replace-by-revocation)


2. Both parties will “revoke” the old state (i.e. share pre-image of hash)



What does a lightning channel look like? (replace-by-revocation)


Complete!

Both parties can always broadcast the latest state.




What does a lightning channel look like? (replace-by-revocation)



... and a growing list of revoked states... as we will see,
this will be problematic...



What does a lightning channel look like? (replace-by-revocation)



What does a lightning channel look like? (replace-by-revocation)




...

Block 10





What does a lightning channel look like? (replace-by-revocation)




... Block 10




What does a lightning channel look like? (replace-by-revocation)





What does a lightning channel look like? (replace-by-revocation)



What does a lightning channel look like? (replace-by-revocation)



What does a lightning channel look like? (replace-by-revocation)



What does a lightning channel look like? (replace-by-revocation)





JUSTICE TRANSACTION



Alice can steal all coins in the channel (i.e. spend the outputs) by signing a justice transaction




What does a lightning channel look like? (replace-by-revocation)



What does a lightning channel look like? (replace-by-revocation)



What does a lightning channel look like? (replace-by-revocation)



What does a lightning channel look like? (replace-by-revocation)



State N(A)

Alice wins!

Her JUSTICE TRANSACTION was accepted into the blockchain before the dispute process expired!

She punished Bob for trying to cheat **by taking all coins in the channel.**

State 1

State ...

...

Block 10

Block 11

...

...


Block 100

State 1



FAQ: Can Alice just keep a pre-signed justice tx around?

FAQ: Can Alice just keep a pre-signed justice tx around?



Why?

Bob has a LIST of REVOKED transactions
that only HE can broadcast...

She must be ready to prove any of them
are invalid..

Remember, UTXO!


FAQ: Under the hood - what does it look like (roughly speaking)

Funding Transaction




1 BTC, A & B


FAQ: Under the hood - what does it look like (roughly speaking)




FAQ: Under the hood - what does it look like (roughly speaking)



FAQ: Under the hood - what does it look like (roughly speaking)




FAQ: Under the hood - what does it look like (roughly speaking)



Now we know how Lightning Channels
(replace-by-revocation) roughly works...

Let's better understand this watching
network



Watching Network

Monitor (Tadge) @ Scaling Bitcoin '16




**Leaning
Watch Tower**



Monitor (Tadge) @ Scaling Bitcoin '16


But what does she send to the watch tower?



Leaning
Watch Tower




Monitor (Tadge) @ Scaling Bitcoin '16




Leaning
Watch Tower

Bob's Tx (State N)



Alice's JUSTICE TX




Monitor (Tadge) @ Scaling Bitcoin '16

Tx Locator

Let's watching service find transaction when dispute is triggered

Encryption Key

Used to encryption Justice Transaction, only discoverable when a dispute is triggered.



Leaning
Watch Tower

Bob's TX (State N)

TXID [32 bytes]

TxLocator = [16:0]

Encryption Key = [16:32]



4410c8d14ff9f87ceed1d65cb58e7c7b2422b2d7529afc675208ce2ce09ed7d

TxLocator


Encryption Key

Monitor (Tadge) @ Scaling Bitcoin '16

Encrypted Justice Transaction

Alice encrypts the pre-signed justice transaction.

It can ONLY be decrypted by watchtower if there is a dispute
(or if bob leaks the key)



Leaning
Watch Tower

Encrypted Justice TX

Bob's TX (State N)

TXID [32 bytes]

TxLocator = [16:0]
Encryption Key = [16:32]

σ_A, S

1 BTC, A


σ_A



Monitor (Tadge) @ Scaling Bitcoin '16

Send to the Watching Service

TxLocator & Encrypted Justice
Transaction




Leaning
Watch Tower

TxLocator & Encrypted Justice Transaction




Monitor (Tadge) @ Scaling Bitcoin '16




**Leaning
Watch Tower**

... Block 10




TxLocator1:ENCJustice
TxLocator2:ENCJustice
TxLocator3:ENCJustice
TxLocator4:ENCJustice
TxLocator5:ENCJustice
TxLocator6:ENCJustice
TxLocator7:ENCJustice

Monitor (Tadge) @ Scaling Bitcoin '16



Leaning
Watch Tower



`TxLocator1:ENCJustice`
`TxLocator2:ENCJustice`
`TxLocator3:ENCJustice`
`TxLocator4:ENCJustice`
`TxLocator5:ENCJustice`
`TxLocator6:ENCJustice`
`TxLocator7:ENCJustice`

Monitor (Tadge) @ Scaling Bitcoin '16



Watching Service - 5 Steps

1. Extract Transaction ID
2. Compute TxLocator + Key
3. Find "encrypted blob"
4. Decrypt it!
5. Broadcast to the network



Leaning Watch Tower



TxLocator1:ENCJustice
TxLocator2:ENCJustice
TxLocator3:ENCJustice
TxLocator4:ENCJustice
TxLocator5:ENCJustice
TxLocator6:ENCJustice
TxLocator7:ENCJustice

... Block 10 Block 11




Monitor (Tadge) @ Scaling Bitcoin '16




Watching Service - 5 Steps

1. Extract Transaction ID
2. Compute TxLocator + Key
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**Leaning
Watch Tower**

TxLocator1:ENCJustice
TxLocator2:ENCJustice
TxLocator3:ENCJustice
TxLocator4:ENCJustice
TxLocator5:ENCJustice
TxLocator6:ENCJustice
TxLocator7:ENCJustice



Monitor (Tadge) @ Scaling Bitcoin '16



Watching Service - 5 Steps

Let's look at the good, bad and the ugly



Leaning
Watch Tower

```
Locator1:ENCJustice  
TxLocator2:ENCJustice  
TxLocator3:ENCJustice  
TxLocator4:ENCJustice  
TxLocator5:ENCJustice  
TxLocator6:ENCJustice  
TxLocator7:ENCJustice
```

...

Block 10

Block 11

Block 12


State 1



Monitor - THE GOOD

Channel-Privacy


We don't know anything
about channel until
dispute
(Can also send us junk)

Responder, not trigger

We CANNOT trigger any
disputes! Only respond
if the counterparty
tries to cheat.

Simple Protocol

Just store encrypted
blob and watch
blockchain to retrieve
decryption key




**Leaning
Watch Tower**

Monitor - THE GOOD, BAD

Channel-Privacy We don't know anything about channel until dispute (Can also send us junk)	O(N) Storage Watching service must store a justice transaction for EVERY new state update.	Responder, not trigger We CANNOT trigger any disputes! Only respond if the counterparty tries to cheat.
---	--	---

Congestion BIG problem Watching service only has a pre-signed transaction and very very awkward to bump fees	Simple Protocol Just store encrypted blob and watch blockchain to retrieve decryption key
--	---




**Leaning
Watch Tower**

Monitor - THE GOOD, BAD, AND THE UGLY

Channel-Privacy We don't know anything about channel until dispute (Can also send us junk)	O(N) Storage Watching service must store a justice transaction for EVERY new state update.	Responder, not trigger We CANNOT trigger any disputes! Only respond if the counterparty tries to cheat.
---	--	---

Congestion BIG problem Watching service only has a pre-signed transaction and very very awkward to bump fees	Simple Protocol Just store encrypted blob and watch blockchain to retrieve decryption key	HOPES FOR AVAILABILITY Hire hundreds of watchers and only 1 is rewarded. What if they don't respond? Tough luck
--	---	---




**Leaning
Watch Tower**

View of how a “watching network” might work so far




Leaning

Watch Tower




Leaning

Watch Tower




Leaning

Watch Tower




Leaning

Watch Tower



Leaning

Watch Tower



Leaning

Watch Tower

Hire multiple watch towers

And hope one responds!
Goal for “Monitor” was CHANNEL
Privacy.



Reward Policy?

Only the one watch tower who gets
their respective justice tx in
the blockchain **will get rewarded.**

WatchTower @ BPASE'18





Figure 5: Overview of the off-chain protocol.

*The actual construction is slightly different, it commits to the “version, randomness” which is revealed, but this is easier to explain.

WatchTower @ BPASE'18




*The actual construction is slightly different, it commits to the “version, randomness” which is revealed, but this is way easier to explain.

WatchTower @ BPASE'18



Watching Service - 5 Steps

1. Extract Transaction ID
2. Look up the latest "i" received
3. Broadcast it!



Leaning
Watch Tower

$\text{TxLocator}:\sigma_A, \sigma_B, i$

...

Block 10

Block 11




WatchTower @ BPASE'18



Watching Service - 5 Steps

1. Extract Transaction ID
2. Look up the latest "i" received
3. Broadcast it!



Leaning
Watch Tower

σ_A, σ_B, i

TxLocator: σ_A, σ_B, i

...

Block 10

Block 11



State 1

WatchTower @ BPASE'18



Watching Service - 5 Steps

1. Extract Transaction ID
2. Look up the latest "i" received
3. Broadcast it!



Leaning
Watch Tower

TxLocator: σ_A, σ_B, i

σ_A, σ_B, i

...

Block 10

Block 11



State 1

WatchTower @ BPASE'18



Watching Service - 5 Steps

1. Extract Transaction ID
2. Look up the latest "i" received
3. Broadcast it!



Leaning
Watch Tower

TxLocator: σ_A, σ_B, i

...

Block 10

Block 11

Block 12


State 1


σ_A, σ_B, i

WatchTower @ BPASE'18



Watching Service - 5 Steps

Let's look at the good, bad and the ugly



Leaning
Watch Tower

Indicator: σ_A, σ_B, i

...

Block 10

Block 11

Block 12

State 1

σ_A, σ_B, i

Watch Tower - THE GOOD

Verifiable Job


No longer store junk.
We know it is a useful
job.

Separates TX + State

We are broadcasting the
“latest state” and not
necessarily a bitcoin
transaction. Cleaner
solution.

0(1) Storage

Only store the job with
the largest version.




**Leaning
Watch Tower**

Watch Tower - THE GOOD, BAD

Verifiable Job No longer store junk. We know it is a useful job.	Accountability? No No evidence a watch tower was hired and if they don't do their job, no way to prove it.	Separates TX + State We are broadcasting the "latest state" and not necessarily a bitcoin transaction. Cleaner solution.
---	--	--

No financial deterrent We need to rely on the reputation of a watching service (or hire multiple) since no skin-in-the-game	0(1) Storage Only store the job with the largest version.
---	---




**Leaning
Watch Tower**

Watch Tower - THE GOOD, BAD, AND THE UGLY

Verifiable Job No longer store junk. We know it is a useful job.	Accountability? No No evidence a watch tower was hired and if they don't do their job, no way to prove it.	Separates TX + State We are broadcasting the "latest state" and not necessarily a bitcoin transaction. Cleaner solution.
---	--	--

No financial deterrent We need to rely on the reputation of a watching service (or hire multiple) since no skin-in-the-game	0(1) Storage Only store the job with the largest version.	Consensus Upgrade We need a new OP_CODE for eltoo to work, so we don't get the benefits of watch tower.
---	---	---



**Leaning
Watch Tower**

PISA @ Scaling Bitcoin '19

We don't care too much about the underlying payment channel construction.

It can be replace-by-revocation (today)
or replace-by-version (eltoo).



**Leaning
Watch Tower**

Monitor-style Jobs

TxLocator +
Encrypted TX

Eltoo-style Jobs

TxLocator &
Authorised State
Version

Outpost-style Jobs

TxLocator +
Decryption Key
(Find out later)



PISA @ Scaling Bitcoin '19

On-chain evidence

If PISA doesn't respond, clear on-chain evidence.

Signed Receipt

An acknowledgement that PISA accepted a job



Leaning Watch Tower



Requires a new **OPCODE** to support SPV Proof, parsing receipt & covenants




PISA Contract with security deposit

PISA (Monitor) @ Scaling Bitcoin '19




TxLocator1 & ENCJustice




Leaning
Watch Tower

PISA (Monitor) @ Scaling Bitcoin '19



PISA (Monitor) @ Scaling Bitcoin '19



PISA (Monitor) @ Scaling Bitcoin '19



BONUS POINTS - Fair real-time payments

We can use a simple HTLC transfer to guarantee fair exchange of signed receipt + payment over the lightning network.

Just put $H(R)$ in receipt and PISA reveals "R" to redeem HTLC payment.


Encr
Tran

Appointment start: Block 10

Appointment Expiry: Block 500


Minimum Dispute Period: 50 blocks

Signature by PISA: σ_{PISA}



Leaning
Watch Tower


Monitor (Tadge) @ Scaling Bitcoin '16



Scenario


Bob triggered a dispute,
PISA failed to respond,
Bob gets the coins.

How can Alice prove wrongdoing?



**Leaning
Watch Tower**

TxLocator1:ENCJustice
TxLocator2:ENCJustice
TxLocator3:ENCJustice
TxLocator4:ENCJustice
TxLocator5:ENCJustice
TxLocator6:ENCJustice
TxLocator7:ENCJustice



Monitor (Tadge) @ Scaling Bitcoin '16





In-depth Signed Receipt

Encrypted Justice: ENCJustice
Transaction Locator: TxLocator1
Appointment Start: Block 10
Appointment Expiry: Block 500
Minimum Dispute Period: 50 blocks
Signature by PISA: σ_{PISA}

Anyone can verify the “dispute details” via blockchain:

- TxLocator1 FOUND
- Dispute triggered between block 10 and 500
- Assume for now dispute time is >50 blocks



Leaning
Watch Tower


TxLocator1:ENCJustice
TxLocator2:ENCJustice
TxLocator3:ENCJustice
TxLocator4:ENCJustice
TxLocator5:ENCJustice
TxLocator6:ENCJustice
TxLocator7:ENCJustice

Monitor (Tadge) @ Scaling Bitcoin '16



In-depth Signed Receipt


Encrypted Justice: ENCJustice
Transaction Locator: TxLocator1
Appointment Start: Block 10
Appointment Expiry: Block 500
Minimum Dispute Period: 50 blocks
Signature by PISA: σ_{PISA}



Leaning Watch Tower

Anyone can decrypt ENCJustice and verify:

- Valid justice transaction
- Not included in the blockchain at all




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TxLocator2:ENCJustice
TxLocator3:ENCJustice
TxLocator4:ENCJustice
TxLocator5:ENCJustice
TxLocator6:ENCJustice
TxLocator7:ENCJustice

Monitor (Tadge) @ Scaling Bitcoin '16




Reputational Accountability, not Financial
Publicly verifiable that PISA accepted the job and failed to do its duty by the customer.

With a consensus upgrade, the evidence of SPV proof for dispute + Bob's spend transaction, could be used to slash/refund customer.



**Leaning
Watch Tower**

TxLocator1:ENCJustice
TxLocator2:ENCJustice
TxLocator3:ENCJustice
TxLocator4:ENCJustice
TxLocator5:ENCJustice
TxLocator6:ENCJustice
TxLocator7:ENCJustice




Monitor (Tadge) @ Scaling Bitcoin '16



Reputational Accountability, not Financial
Publicly verifiable that PISA accepted the job and

Let's look at the good, bad and the ugly



Leaning
Watch Tower

Locator1:ENCJustice
TxLocator2:ENCJustice
TxLocator3:ENCJustice
TxLocator4:ENCJustice
TxLocator5:ENCJustice
TxLocator6:ENCJustice
TxLocator7:ENCJustice

...	Block 10	Block 11	Block 110
		State 1			Bob wins

PISA - THE GOOD

Channel-Privacy


By re-using the Monitor protocol, PISA doesn't know what channel is being watched!

Accountability

We can prove to anyone that a PISA-tower cheated.

Simple Protocol

Adopting a signed receipt for different channel constructions is relatively straight-forward.




**Leaning
Watch Tower**

PISA - THE GOOD, BAD

Channel-Privacy By re-using the Monitor protocol, PISA doesn't know what channel is being watched!	$O(1)$ OR $O(N)$ Storage Depends on the underlying channel construction (or if ENCJustice is stored on-chain via OUTPOST)	Accountability We can prove to anyone that a PISA-tower cheated.
--	---	--

Security Deposit hard While there is "skin in the game", it may be under-collateralised. Provisions (2015) can help.	Simple Protocol Adopting a signed receipt for different channel constructions is relatively straight-forward.
--	---




**Leaning
Watch Tower**

PISA - THE GOOD, BAD, AND THE UGLY

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--	---	--

Security Deposit hard While there is "skin in the game", it may be under-collateralised. Provisions (2015) can help.	Simple Protocol Adopting a signed receipt for different channel constructions is relatively straight-forward.	Consensus Upgrade We need a new OP_CODE for the slashing condition. Very likely, will not get into Bitcoin soon.
--	---	--



**Leaning
Watch Tower**



Watching Networks for Bitcoin (no forks)

<p>No financial deterrent</p> <p>No way for the blockchain to self-enforce that via slashing.</p>	<p>Channel-Privacy</p> <p>By re-using the Monitor protocol, PISA doesn't know what channel is being watched!</p>	<p>$O(N)$ Storage/Updates</p> <p>Depends in Monitor or Outpost. $O(N)$ implies we need $N-1$ encrypted blobs, so it leaks number of transfers.</p>	<p>Reputation Accountability via Signed Receipt</p> <p>We can prove to anyone that a PISA-tower cheated.</p>
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Watching Networks for Bitcoin (no forks)

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<p>Fair exchange payment + job via offchain tx</p> <p>PISA can be hired via the lightning network. Not knowing which channel hired it.</p>	<p>Watching Networks for Bitcoin (no forks)</p>		<p>TX + State Intertwined == bumping fee is HARD</p> <p>PISA can't sign state & broadcast it, must get a "pre-signed" justice tx.</p>

<p>No financial deterrent</p> <p>No way for the blockchain to self-enforce that via slashing.</p>	<p>Channel-Privacy</p> <p>By re-using the Monitor protocol, PISA doesn't know what channel is being watched!</p>	<p>O(N) Storage/Updates</p> <p>Depends in Monitor or Outpost. O(N) implies we need N-1 encrypted blobs, so it leaks number of transfers.</p>	<p>Reputation Accountability via Signed Receipt</p> <p>We can prove to anyone that a PISA-tower cheated.</p>
<p>Fair exchange payment + job via offchain tx</p> <p>PISA can be hired via the lightning network. Not knowing which channel hired it.</p>	<p>Watching Networks for Bitcoin (no forks)</p>		<p>TX + State Intertwined == bumping fee is HARD</p> <p>PISA can't sign state & broadcast it, must get a "pre-signed" justice tx.</p>
<p>Consensus upgrades required</p> <p>A lot of problems can be fixed. We, as a community, must seriously consider them.</p>	<p>Responder, not trigger</p> <p>We CANNOT trigger any disputes! Only respond if the counterparty tries to cheat.</p>	<p>No Verifiable Jobs (May store junk)</p> <p>Important that PISA is paid up-front for storing "blobs" and not via bounties.</p>	<p>Simple Protocol</p> <p>Encrypting and decrypting blobs is straight forward, but reducing O(N) storage "constant" is ugly.</p>

PISA - WHERE ARE WE NOW?

PRIVATE TEST

Thanks to a heroic effort by Sergi Delgado (speaker yesterday), we have a working basic PISA implementation.

Do you want to try out our watch tower?

Please contact us!




Signed Receipt BOLT

Coming soon to a wallet near you!

(after guinea pigs try out our demo!)

Encrypted Justice: ENCJustice
Transaction Locator: TxLocator1
Appointment Start: Block 10
Appointment Expiry: Block 500
Minimum Dispute Period: 50 blocks
Cipher + Hash Function: AES-ACM & SHA256
Signature by PISA: σ_{PISA}

PISA - Final word about “watchers” and their emerging role



Responder of LAST resort

Financial Liability & Insurance

Watchers take on the “financial liability” for users who go offline.

The “cost” of a watcher is some function of financial liability, number of updates & number of channels watched.


What can a watch tower do?

Protect hubs against crashes + dos attacks by responding to malicious customer closures

What can a watch tower NOT do?


Protect hubs against insider threats, theft of signing keys, etc.

PISA - Final word about “watchers” and their emerging role



Payment channel hubs


Customers generally trust hubs (we see this today), but for hubs, all their coins are “effectively” in a hot wallet and **every customer is an adversary.**



Routing Nodes

Peers will open channels with anyone to search out popular routes / best fees. They **WON'T** know or trust their counterparty. So a watch tower is essential.

P/SA
RESEARCH



LIQUIDITY NETWORK



Plasma Group

Settlement System and
Root of Trust of all Layer 2

<https://pisa.watch>

 PisaResearch
paddypisa

